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Abstract: Recently, attention has been drawn to compositional changes in the Federal Reserve 
System's asset holdings. While much attention has been drawn to the deterioration of the balance 
sheet of the Fed in the face of the current crisis, an analysis of the balance sheet policies of the 
Eurosystem is still missing. In this article we fill this gap by analysing the Eurosystem's balance 
sheet during the recent sub-prime crisis. Specifically, the share of the position “Euro area claims in 
foreign currency” of foreign currency claims containing currency swaps climbed from 2.2 % to 7.8 
%, while securities held (i.e., marketable securities, which may potentially be used for monetary 
policy operations) almost doubled from 7.9 % to 15.7 %. Simultaneously, the share of gold reserves 
fell from 15.3 % to 11.9 %. The calculation of certain balance sheet ratios supports the assessment 
that a significant decrease in the quality of money has occurred. 
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Introduction 
 
The development of the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve System during the present financial 
crisis has recently gained attention (Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack 2004, Cecchetti 2009, Bagus and 
Schiml 2009a, Brunnermeier 2009).1 While voices have warned of the deterioration in the balance 
sheet of the Fed while facing the current crisis, an analysis of the balance sheet policies of the 
Eurosystem and its effect on the quality of the Euro has been neglected. This article fills this gap by 
analysing the balance sheet of the Eurosystem during the subprime crisis between June 2007 and 
March 2009. 
 
During the financial crisis the European Central Bank (ECB) acted as a “lender of last resort” to an 
unprecedented degree. This dimension of the new monetary policies manifests itself in the 
consolidated balance sheet of the Eurosystem, i.e., the balance sheet of the ECB and  member states' 
central banks . Comparing the asset side of the balance sheet from June 2007 before the crisis broke 
out with the more recent position of March 2009, important changes are discerned.  
 
Most importantly, a dramatic expansion on the asset side occurred with the relative proportions of 
the different holdings changing substantially. While the first group of alterations have been amply 
assessed as “quantitative easing,” the second group, which we refer to as “qualitative easing”, has 
gone relatively unnoticed.2  
 
                                               
1
 McKean (1949) provides an early exposition of the need to delve into the compositional holdings affecting the 
liquidity positions on central bank balance sheets. Mishkin (1978) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2002) have provided 
more recent evidence that financial calamities are propagated and transmitted through balance sheet compositional 
shifts. 
2
 Bagus and Schiml (2008, 2009a) have introduced the term “qualitative easing” to refer to the balance sheet policies 
that deteriorate the average quality of central bank assets. Qualitative easing refers, thus, to those effects stemming 
from compositional changes in a central bank's balance sheet holdings. An exception to the neglect of qualitative 
easing is found in Buiter (2009a; 2009b), and Bagus and Schiml (2009b). Buiter, however, defines the term 
somewhat differently as  “a shift in the composition of the assets of the central bank (i.e., the Bank of England) 
towards less liquid and riskier assets, holding constant the size of the balance sheet.” In his analysis Buiter 
concentrates on the policies of the Bank of England.  
 While the changes in the Eurosystem´s balance sheet are dramatic, they beg the question as to what 
their true relevance is. In this article, we answer this question by pointing out that these qualitative 
effects on both currency prices and volatilities have been widely neglected in the recent literature on 
the financial crisis. This paper brings forth new-found evidence that these considerations serve an 
integral part in understanding the ancillary effects reverberating through the financial system today. 
 
The economic significance of central banks' balance sheets 
 
The analysis of balance sheets and balance sheet policies is an established research field in business 
studies. While the theory of balance sheet analysis in business is well developed, the analysis of 
central banks' balance sheets has been widely neglected. The theory of balance sheet analysis 
developed for the business community is helpful for analysing the Eurosystem's actions during the 
financial crisis. Specifically, the connection between the qualitative aspects of balance sheet 
analysis with the quality theory of money proves useful.  
 
The quality theory of money claims that the demand for money is determined by qualitative 
considerations. Consequently, the quantity of money is merely one of several factors that influences 
the quality of money.3 The quality of money can be defined as the capacity of a good, subjectively 
perceived by an actor, to fulfil money's main functions, i.e., to serve as a medium of exchange, a 
store of value and as a unit of account.4  
 
Some of the factors that affect the function of money as a store of value are recorded in the central 
                                               
3
  The quality of money enjoyed a respected existence prior to the introduction of the more modern version of the  
“quantity theory of money” by Fisher (1911). See Mariana (1609), Menger (1871), and Beckhart (1940) for early 
explorations in the quality theory of money. More recent examples can be found in Hazlitt (1978) and Cunningham 
(1992). 
4
 This definition does not touch upon the important difference that Shostak (2000) makes between claim and credit 
transactions. For Shostak, claims transactions entail a claim to money and form part of the money supply. Credit 
transactions do not form part of the money supply as there is no immediate claim on money. 
bank's balance sheet.5 Therefore, the evolution of the balance sheet of the central bank is important 
in understanding shifts in the perceived quality of money – particularly through changes on the asset 
side. Assets represent the means that the central bank may use to defend the value of its currency 
internally and externally by selling them against their liabilities, i.e., the monetary base. When the 
central bank uses its assets to defend its currency, this procedure represents a de facto redemption. 
The holders of the currency “redeem“ it against the sold assets. The higher quality, or more liquid, 
are the assets that a central bank owns, the better it can guarantee the long-term value of its 
currency and its function as a store of value.6 Moreover, in the extreme case of a monetary reform, 
the assets a central bank owns can be used in order to sustain confidence back a new currency. 
Hence, the evolution of the assets of a central bank plays a pivotal role in determining the quality of 
a currency and, consequently, its purchasing power. 
 
Thus, the analysis of central bank balance sheets is very important for the evaluation of a currency's 
quality. In fact, it is possible that the balance sheet total as well as specific monetary aggregates do 
not change, while its composition deteriorates substantially. Even in the face of quantitatively 
similar situations, qualitative changes can cause remarkable differences in the overall value of a 
currency.  
 
Deterioration in the quality of central bank assets may foreshadow future developments of monetary 
aggregates. It is possible to discern from the balance sheet the limits for swaps of good assets (i.e., 
highly liquid) against bad assets (i.e., illiquid) necessary to stabilise the banking system. When the 
amount of liquid assets shrinks, it becomes at some point necessary to expand the balance sheet to 
lend additional support to the banking system. This expansion can subsequently influence monetary 
aggregates. Furthermore, a deterioration in assets' quality can indicate an imminent recapitalisation 
                                               
5
  For an intensive account on the quality of money and balance sheets, see Bagus and Schiml (2008). For a case study 
concerning the quality of money during late 19th century America, see Bagus (2008). 
6
  It is important to note that there is a distinction between merely saying that the cash position (sometime called 
liquidity position) of a central bank is lower, and that the quality of assets held has fallen. The former implies a move 
from cash (money) to bonds (not money), the latter concentrates on a move from safe bonds to risky ones.  
of the central bank by the government. Consequently, as recapitalisation entails the possibility of 
increases in the quantity of money to finance it, the quality of money will be negatively affected. 
 
An historical account of the current crisis as reflected in the Eurosystem´s balance sheet 
policies  
 
The theoretical foundation we developed in the last section is especially useful in times when 
traditional tools to analyse monetary policy are limited. In fact, central banks of the world are 
reaching what economists call “the zero-bound” of interest rates. The Fed has already reached the 
zero-bound while the Eurosystem is quickly approaching this point.7 This makes an analysis of the 
central bank´s balance sheet increasingly important to aid future monetary policy as both qualitative 
and quantitative changes become the only policy tools available to the central banker to fight 
recession.  
 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2004) demonstrate that liquidity traps obtain only at the zero-bound, as 
interest rate policy becomes ineffective. In response, alternative policy measures must be 
implemented. However, while central bank communications are widely seen as increasingly 
effective policy response in the face of the zero-bound (Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack 2004, 
Güraynak, Sack and Swanson 2005, and Rosa and Verga 2008), the credibility of these statements 
adds an instrumental component.8 The quality of a central bank's reserve assets, as recorded on its 
balance sheet, gains increased importance as these represent the credibility that the communicated 
policies will actually come to fruition. 
 In the following we analyse the balance sheet of the Fed during the subprime crisis from 
June 2007 to December 2008 drawing on tools developed in Bagus and Schiml (2008).  
                                               
7
 The Bank of Japan has meandered along the zero-bound since February 1999. More recently, the Bank of Canada 
and the Swiss National Bank have also succumbed to the limitations the zero-bound imposes. 
8
 The past 20 years have seen a veritable explosion in research concerning what constitutes appropriate and effective 
central bank communication. For brevity, the reader is referred to Blinder et al. (2008) for a summary of these 
developments. 
  
Figure 1: Quantitative Easing: Asset side of the ECB balance sheet from 06/2007 to 03/2009 
(weekly, millions Euros) 
Source: ECB (2009). 
 
Looking at developments on the asset side of the ECB's balance sheet in figure 1 four stages can be 
identified. During the first stage of the crisis from June 2007 to December 2007 the size of the 
balance sheet increased under high volatility. This stage also involved a moderate change in the 
composition of the balance sheet as portrayed in figure 2 which shows the development of the asset 
side in percentage terms.  
 
  
Figure 2: Qualitative Easing: Asset side of the Eurosystem balance sheet from 06/2007 to 03/2009 
(weekly, %) 
Source: ECB (2009) 
 
In December 2007 the second stage started, marked by a steady increase in the size of the balance 
sheet. In September 2008 the compositional changes accelerated and were accompanied by a 
significant quantitative expansion until December 2008.  During the fourth stage from January to 
March 2009 part of the former expansion and compositional changes were reversed. In the 
following, we will delve more closely on the monetary policy decisions of the Eurosystem that 
brought about these particular changes. We will also see that a purely numerical consideration of the 
balance sheet is insufficient to account for qualitative changes that are not so easily measurable. 
 
Stage 1 
During the first stage from June 2007 and December 2008 the balance sheet total increased under 
considerable volatility, with simultaneous compositional changes, as depicted in figure 3. 
  
Figure 3: Lending operations to Euro area credit operation from 06/2007 to 03/2009 (in %, weekly) 
Source: ECB (2009) 
 
While the proportion of the longer-term refinancing operations of three-month maturity increased, 
the proportion of the main refinancing operations of two-week maturity decreased. The decline of 
the more liquid main refinancing operations and the increase in the less liquid longer-term 
refinancing caused the average liquidity of the assets of the Eurosystem to deteriorate considerably. 
A gold sale of 42 tonnes on November 30th also served to negatively affect the bank’s liquidity 
position. 
 
These measures of increasing longer-term financing proved the willingness of the Eurosystem to 
counter the tensions in the economic system with novel, and untested, monetary policies.  
 
Moreover, the position “other assets” and “securities” increased markedly. The position “securities” 
entails marketable securities, which may potentially be used for monetary policy operations. Thus, 
this position can entail a very broad range of potentially low quality securities. The position “other 
assets” fails to provide additional transparency. According to the ECB glossary it entails items used 
in the course of settlement: member state coins and other financial assets such as equity shares, 
participating interests, investment portfolios related to central banks' own funds, pension funds and 
severance schemes or securities held due to statutory requirements. This position also contains 
tangible and intangible fixed assets, revaluation differences of off-balance sheet instruments as well 
as accruals and deferred expenditures. Thus, these two positions lack transparency and may contain 
relatively low quality assets. The sum of these positions increased throughout the crisis, adding to 
uncertainty concerning the quality of the ECB's asset holdings. In general, the Eurosystem's policies 
lack transparency, which increases the uncertainty concerning the quality of the assets backing its 
currency and contradicts a basic principle of accountability.9 The transparency of the assets backing 
a currency is also important for the currency's quality. The lower the transparency the higher is the 
risk that the currency is backed by low quality (i.e., illiquid) assets. 
  
Stage 2 
In December 2007 the crisis gained momentum. Citigroup was forced to support its off-balance 
entities (i.e., structured investment vehicles – SIVs). As a consequence, credit markets, especially 
those denominated in US dollars seized up. In a common effort central banks around the world tried 
to improve dollar liquidity and instituted swap lines with the Federal Reserve. Thus, credit 
institutions in the Euro area commenced borrowing dollars from the Eurosystem against 
Eurosystem-eligible collateral, resulting in an increase in the position “Euro area claims in foreign 
currency”. The swap lines were increased in January and again in March 2008 when Bear Stearns 
found itself in refinancing problems. Consequently, the uncertainty in the markets again increased 
and credit markets seized up. Concurrent with the increase in swap lines the Eurosystem introduced 
two additional three-month longer-term refinancing operations of €50 billion each and for the first 
                                               
9
 Hayek (1925) criticized accounting practices of the Fed regarding their transparency as early as 1924. Rothbard 
(2000) advances a similar critique concerning the accounting practices at the Fed during the Hoover administration. 
The accounting practices of the Eurosystem have continued this trend of poor transparency, adversely affecting the 
currency's quality through increased uncertainty concerning its backing assets. 
time a duo of six-month longer-term refinancing operations of €25 billion each. As a result, the 
trend towards longer-term assets on the Eurosystem balance sheet accelerated. In addition, the 
Eurosystem again sold highly liquid short-term assets of zero maturity, namely 30 tonnes of gold on 
June 30th 2008. 
 
It is noteworthy that in the first two stages of the crisis from June 2007 to September 2008 the 
balance sheet total expanded substantially by 21.4 %. While the balance sheet total increased, the 
quality of the balance sheet and, consequently, the quality of the currency deteriorated considerably.  
The amount of high-quality and very liquid assets remained either constant (i.e., in the case of 
government debts) or was reduced (i.e., in the case of gold). In contrast, the amount of longer-term, 
and thus lower quality, assets increased by augmenting the longer-term refinancing operations and 
by increasing the non-transparent position of “Other Assets” and “Securities”.  
 
On September 4th 2008 the Eurosystem announced a measure in order to improve the collateral 
against which it was lending and thereby increase the quality of its currency. The Eurosystem's rules 
on collateral were more flexible than those of other major central banks. Specifically, they allowed 
asset backed securities to be used as collateral dependent on a rating of at least “A-”. Due to this 
flexibility, the Eurosystem, did not have to introduce new facilities to allow for new types of 
collateral. The existing facilities were sufficient and adequately flexible to satisfy the liquidity 
needs of European financial institutions. Moreover, the eligible counter-parties (i.e., all banks 
holding minimum reserves with the relevant national central bank) were relatively broad, especially 
compared to the Fed, which had a more restricted number of counter-parties. The danger for the 
Eurosystem was, however, that during the financial crisis banks with international subsidiaries 
would use the relatively less strict rules and use their lower quality collateral to secure financing by 
the Eurosystem.10 As a result, the Eurosystem announced on September 4th 2009 that it would 
                                               
10
 It has been argued that foreign banks designed asset-backed securities (ABS) in order to get financing from the 
Eurosystem (Cochrane 2008). 
strengthen its rules concerning collateral-backed financing for financial intermediaries, coming into 
effect the 1st of February, 2009. Thus, asset-backed securities not denominated in Euros were 
disallowed in order to prevent the shifting of low quality assets on a world-wide scale by 
international banks to the Eurosystem.  
 
Stage 3 
The third stage of the crisis was initiated by the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman 
Brothers on September 15th, 2008. In order to support credit markets, the Eurosystem increased its 
lending operations considerably. In particular a special term refinancing operation was allotted on 
September 29th. Furthermore, the long-term refinancing operations were increased and a six month 
supplementary long-term refinancing operation of €50 billion (an increase of €25 billion from the 
previous announcement) was announced on the 7th of October to take effect the following day. On 
October 15th additional longer-term refinancing operations of three and six month durations were 
announced. The swap lines and dollar lending facilities were extended sharply in September from  
$50 billion to  $240 Billion. Moreover, in October additional long-term (7-day, 28-day, and 84-day) 
US dollar financing options were introduced. 
 
Perhaps most detrimentally, the non-transparent positions of “Securities” and “Other assets” 
increased commensurately. These policies made the balance sheet total increase by more than 1/3 in 
a period of only one month from the 22th of September to the 27th of October 2008. This expansion 
of the balance sheet on the asset side was matched by the increase of fresh bank reserves on the 
liability side.  
 
During the third stage, the average quality of assets backing the Euro was reduced. This qualitative 
easing was shown by the increase in the relative positions of “lending operations”, “Claims on non-
euro area residents denominated in foreign currency” (i.e., currency swaps), “other assets” and 
“securities” while the relative weightings of gold and government debt decreased. Not only did the 
average quality of the Eurosystem's assets deteriorate by the quantitative expansion, but quality 
further deteriorated by changes in the collateral rules and eligible counter-parties. On October 13th 
the Eurosystem announced U.S. dollar funding at 7-day, 28-day and 84-day maturities at fixed 
interest rates for full allotment which effectively meant that there was no limit on the amount of 
dollars available to be used in swap lines. On October 15th 2008 the list of assets eligible for credit 
operations was increased. Most importantly for the quality of the assets on its balance sheet, the 
Eurosystem announced that it would lower the credit threshold for marketable and non-marketable 
assets from A- to BBB-, with the exception of asset-backed securities (ABS). 
 
We cannot know which positions of the Eurosystem's balance sheet exactly began to be backed by 
up to BBB- collateral during this 3rd stage. Nevertheless, the incentives for the banking system were 
to become more aligned with the increasingly lenient rules. The average quality of the Eurosystem's 
assets was further reduced by the introduction of swap lines with central banks whose currencies 
were depreciating (i.e., Hungary and Poland). The Eurosystem also established a swap line with the 
Danish central bank exposing it to further currency and credit risks. 
 
In sum, the average quality of the assets of the Eurosystem and thus, the backing assets of the Euro, 
diminished through a tendency towards longer-term, less liquid assets, and by accepting a broader 
range of lower quality collateral. Increasing the range of eligible counter-parties caused detrimental 
non-quantitative deductions in the quality of the assets backing the currency. 
 
 
Stage 4  
In stage 4 from January to March 2009, pressure was relieved slightly from the credit markets. As a 
consequence, the previous qualitative easing was partially unwound. This “qualitative tightening” 
can be expressed by several measures. First, the balance sheet of the Eurosystem contracted as the 
amount of lending operations and especially longer-term refinancing operations were reduced as 
some operations were not rolled-over. Additionally the amount of outstanding currency swaps 
declined. However, the amount of the non-transparent and potentially most problematic positions of 
“Securities” and “Other assets” remained approximately the same.  
 
Second, the Eurosystem announced a further tightening of the standards for the collateral accepted 
by its credit operations. Thus, the Eurosystem requires a rating of AAA/Aaa as an additional 
eligibility criterion for all asset-backed securities issued after March 1st, 2009. The future use of 
uncovered bank bonds as collateral has also been restricted. However, the changes made on October 
15th broadening the accepted collateral will stay into effect until the end of 2009 which means that 
the announced tightening will become relevant only later, in 2010. Rather, the Eurosystem seems to 
be preparing for the post-financial crisis period by ensuring it holds higher quality assets.  
  
 
An analysis of the Eurosystem´s balance sheet ratios 
 
The changes in the balance sheet can also be analysed by calculating certain central bank balance 
sheet ratios as developed in Bagus and Schiml (2008). One of these ratios is the “defense ratio” 
which proxies the capacity of a central bank to defend its own currency in international currency 
markets by selling foreign reserves (i.e., a ratio of foreign reserves to total assets). The evolution of 
the defense ratio is depicted in figure 4: 
  
Figure 4: Defense ratio 
(June 2007 to March 2009, monthly) 
Source: ECB (2009). 
 
The defense ratio has continued to decline during the financial crisis, falling from over 12% to  
approximately 8.5%. Consequently, it became more difficult for the Eurosystem to support its 
currency by intervening in the foreign exchange markets.  
 
Finally, the equity ratio indicates the leverage employed. Its importance lies in the function of 
equity to cushion losses. When the central bank suffers losses on its assets, equity serves to absorb 
and offset them. A low or negative equity ratio makes a recapitalisation by the government likely. 
This recapitalisation leads to an increase in the government deficit and enhances the probability of 
the monetisation of this debt. The monetisation of government debts increases the quantity of 
money and, thereby, negatively affects the quality of money.  
 Figure 5: Adjusted equity ratio of the Eurosystem during the subprime crisis (6/2007-03/2009) 
Source: Eurosystem (2009) 
 
 
As shown in figure 5, the (adjusted) equity ratio of the Eurosystem fluctuated under high volatility 
in the first two stages of the crisis. In the third stage from September through October 2008 the 
equity ratio fell to 12% due to the sharp expansion of the balance sheet. If the Eurosystem suffers 
losses of 14% of its assets, a recapitalisation will become necessary.11  
 
The Eurosystem faces a significant political problem when it comes to recapitalisation. There is a 
sharing rule among the 16 national central banks (that, together with the ECB make up the 
Eurosystem) concerning the sharing of losses incurred in the conduct of the common monetary and 
liquidity management policy. This sharing rule affects only the distribution and not the total amount 
of capital within the Eurosystem. In contrast to other central banks, it is unclear how the 
Eurosystem would be recapitalised should the need arise. Therefore, the development of the equity 
ratio is problematic in relation to the value and trust in the Euro. 
 
                                               
11
  On the possibility of insolvency of central banks see Buiter (2008). 
Concluding remarks 
 
Recent developments in monetary policy make the qualitative analysis of central banks' balance 
sheets important. New analytical tools are necessary for the evaluation of unconventional monetary 
policies. One such tool is balance sheet analysis, as is undertaken in this article. While the Fed's 
balance sheet analysis has received more attention, an analysis of the Eurosystem's balance sheet 
has been neglected. Our analysis of the balance sheet of the Eurosystem from the beginning of the 
crisis in June 2007 to March 2008 has filled this gap and provided important insights pertaining to 
the quality of the Euro. While the Fed's balance sheet policies certainly have been radical, the 
Eurosystem's changes are no less so, even though this might initially seem the case if attention is 
focused solely on the quantitative expansion of the balance sheet's assets. These changes are most 
clearly manifested in compositional changes in the balance sheet. Thus, the share of the position 
“Euro area claims in foreign currency” containing currency swaps climbed from 2.2 % to 7.8 % 
while “Securities“ almost doubled from 7.9 % to 15.7 %. At the same time the share of gold 
reserves fell from 15.3 % to 11.9 %. The shift from high to relatively lower assets becomes apparent 
with detrimental implications for the value of the Euro. 
 
We have assessed the current financial crisis, and the Eurosystem's response to it, as occurring in 
four distinct stages. 
 
During the first two stages the Eurosystem limited its balance sheet policies to slight increases in its 
size and changes in its composition by taking on relatively more illiquid and riskier assets and 
selling gold. New longer-term credit programs appeared in order to support the banking system. As 
a consequence, private financial intermediaries´ balance sheets improved and the ECB's balance 
sheet deteriorated.  
 
The average quality of the assets backing the Euro also deteriorated during the third stage of the 
credit crisis. Particularly, the accepted range of collateral (except for asset-backed securities) in 
credit operations was broadened from A- to BBB-. This was accompanied by a substantial 
expansion of the balance sheet and an increase in the monetary base (i.e., quantitative easing). The 
defense and equity ratios deteriorated considerably. As a strong central bank balance sheet is 
essential for the maintained quality of a currency, the quality of the Euro has been reduced. 
 
Two balance sheet ratios have been discussed pointing to the qualitative deterioration in the 
Eurosystem's assets. First, the defense ratio – that which proxys the ECB's ability to defend the 
Euro's value in the foreign exchange markets – fell over one-third, to 4.5%. Despite showing recent 
improvement, the equity ratio – that which illustrates the leverage employed by the ECB – fell from 
17% to 12% last year. The implication today is that a loss of 14% on Eurosystem assets will bring 
the necessity of recapitalising the central bank – political issues surrounding this eventuality have 
been discussed. 
 
During the first two stages, when the qualitative easing had not yet accelerated, the Euro 
appreciated against the dollar. Yet shortly thereafter, from September to December 2008 the Euro’s 
value actually depreciated. This development might have been caused by a repatriation of foreign 
investments into the United States and a flight to secure U.S. government bonds. Another possible 
explanation is that the Eurosystem has deteriorated the quality of its currency faster than the Fed. In 
fact, the acceptance in October 2008 of a much broader range of collateral assets by the Eurosystem 
points towards this possibility. Previously, Bagus and Schiml (2009a) outlined specific 
deteriorations that have occurred through Fed policies in combating this crisis. We leave the answer 
as to which set of policies has led to more detrimental results concerning currency valuation to 
future research. 
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